# **ATTACHMENT A**

1 IN THE FACTFINDING PROCEEDINGS 2 PURSUANT TO PHOENIX CITY CODE 3 4 5 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 6 LOCAL 2384 (UNIT 2) 7 FACTFINDING REPORT Union, AND 8 ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS & 9 CITY OF PHOENIX, 10 **Employer** 11 12 Factfinder: Najeeb N. Khoury 13 Appearing For the Union: Jennifer Kroll & Dan Bonnett, Martin & Bonnett, P.L.L.C. 14 Appearing For the City: Heidi Gilbert, City Attorney's Office 15 Hearing Dates: April 1 & 2, 2021 16 **BACKGROUND** 17 18 This factfinding proceeding involves the City of Phoenix's Unit 2. Unit 2 consists of 19 skilled trades positions, and is represented by AFSCME Local 2384 ("AFSCME" or "Union"). 20 There are approximately 1,700 budgeted positions in Unit 2. The parties are bargaining for a 21 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will run from July 1, 2021-June 30, 2023. Pursuant 22 to the City's Code and the Phoenix Employment Relations Board's Rules, the parties submitted 23 24 their disputes to factfinding and selected me as the factfinder. The factfinding hearing occurred 25 on April 1 & 2, 2021 in Phoenix, Arizona. 26 27 28 FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 1

#### ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Unlike interest arbitration, where a third-party neutral sets the terms of a new contract, a third party neutral in a factfinding simply provides recommendations. This in essence makes factfinding an extension of bargaining. Ultimately, absent an imposition of terms by the employer, the parties must persuade one another of their positions, and the neutral factfinder provides an outside perspective to help the parties along.

For non-economic issues, neutral factfinders have typically required the party seeking a change to the *status quo* to carry the burden of persuasion, and I will follow that convention. In analyzing each non-economic issue, I will be asking two questions. First, should the *status quo* be changed? The party proposing the change must demonstrate that there is a problem with the *status quo* or that the *status quo* can be improved. Second, does the proposed language solve the problem or enhance the *status quo*? If the answer to this second question is no, I will either recommend the *status quo* or provide a different proposed solution that better addresses the issue identified in the first question.

### ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## **Article 3, Section 3-1 (Wages):**

The City's last offer was a 2% ongoing wage increase and a 3% one-time monetary enhancement for 2021-2022, and a 1.5% ongoing wage increase and a 2.5% one-time monetary enhancement for 2022-2023 plus language stating that the City Council could consider using American Rescue Plan Act ("ARPA") money for further enhancements. However, .5% of ongoing money and .5% of one-time money in 2021-2022 is contingent on the Union accepting what the City has called its transparency package.

The Union's last offer was a 2.5% ongoing wage increase and a 3% one-time monetary enhancement for 2021-2022, and a 2.5% ongoing wage increase and a 3% one-time monetary enhancement for 2022-2023. The Union also asks that there be additional wage enhancements if projected revenues increase year-over-year. The Union further proposes that the parties meet and confer regarding any ARPA money that will be used for wage enhancements.

By way of background, a 1% increase in total compensation for all bargaining units costs the City approximately \$18.8 million across all funds and approximately \$11.8 million to its general fund; a 1% increase in total compensation for Unit 2 employees costs the City approximately \$1.7 million across all funds and approximately \$360,000 to its general fund.

## **City's Position On Economics:**

The City argues that its proposal is generous and in keeping with what other units have agreed upon. The City acknowledges that it is in a fiscally sound position, having a \$153 million surplus in its general fund. The City, however, emphasizes that \$98 million of the surplus is in one-time money and only \$55 million is ongoing, and that one-time money should not be used to pay ongoing costs. The City states that this surplus only reached its current level because federal regulations allowed it to transfer one-time funding from the Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) to the general fund to offset public safety salaries.

The City produces a yearly trial budget after receiving initial input from community stakeholders and City Council members. After a trial budget is presented, the community is allowed to provide input on the trial budget, which then turns into a proposed budget and ultimately an adopted budget. There are often significant changes between a trial budget and the adopted budget. City Manager Ed Zuercher testified that the current Trial Budget for the 2021-2022 budget year seeks to balance community needs for service, organizational needs for FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 3

infrastructure to provide those services, and fair compensation for City employees. He also noted that the City's population is growing, and that the City anticipates needing to hire more employees to provide services. The City's current Trial Budget dedicates 77% of its general fund surplus or \$118 million to employee compensation enhancements, which is in excess of the 70% of its surplus that it dedicated to enhanced compensation in the previous round of negotiations.

In addition to employee compensation enhancements, the Trial Budget dedicates funds to Public Safety Reform & Responsiveness, COVID Relief & Resiliency, Climate Change & Heat Readiness, Affordable Housing & Homelessness, Building Community and Responding to Growth, and Administrative Accountability. Assistant City Manager Jeff Barton testified that any economic enhancements beyond the current offer would require the City to make commensurate cuts to its other priorities which are reflected in the Trial Budget, as the City is legally required to have a balanced budget. Barton also noted that the City has long-term pension obligations which are projected to worsen, with approximately 26% of general fund costs going to pension obligations by 2025-2026.

The City also points out that other bargaining units have already agreed to the offer currently before Unit 2 and that they have "Most Favored Nations" language in their agreements, meaning that the City would be obligated to give the other units increases beyond what their current agreements contemplate.

Budget and Research Director Amber Williamson testified that the City exercises best practices in its budgeting. Therefore, it does not include new or additional revenue streams that have not been realized. She further testified that the City's projected and actual numbers have been historically close, and that the City of Phoenix prides itself on its budgeting accuracy. She FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 4

acknowledged that revenues from recreational marijuana sales and ARPA money are not in the 2021-2022 Trial Budget, as these are new sources of revenue.

### **Union's Position on Economics**

AFSCME argues that its members were asked to sacrifice in hard times, and that they did so willingly; therefore, now that there is a sizeable surplus it is only right that the City offer a better economic package. After the Great Recession, Unit 2 took 3.2% in concessions in its 2010-2012 MOU, had 1.6% of concessions restored in its 2012-2014 MOU; took an additional 2.5% in concessions in its 2014-2016 MOU; received 4.2% restoration of concessions in its 2016-2019 MOU; and finally received 3.5% wage increases in its 2019-2021 MOU. While the last MOU finally got Unit 2 past its concessions, the real dollar wages of its members are still well behind 2010 wages due to inflation. AFSCME points out that the current offer of 3.5% ongoing money over two years will not keep up with CPI, which is projected to be about 2% a year, and that while one-time money is good, it does not help keep up with inflation.

AFSCME notes that increases to Unit 2 do not have the same impact on the general fund as increases to other units, especially sworn units. AFSCME has worked with the City on pension reform for the civilian pension system. Consequently, the civilian pension system is not projected to grow appreciably as a percentage of the general fund in the next five years. Further, a good percentage of Unit 2's salaries are not charged to the general fund, as many employees work in non-general fund, enterprise departments.

Laurie Ann Atienza, Labor Economist for AFSCME, testified that the City's audited financials demonstrate that the City is financially healthy, and that revenues show steady, healthy growth with consistent surpluses. Atienza opined that the City's audited financial statements demonstrate that it can absorb compensation enhancements especially in light of its \$153 million FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 5

surplus, the \$416 million ARPA money coming to the City, and the expectations that the Phoenix area will continue to experience population, employment and income growth.

Finally, AFSCME notes that the Trial Budget does not account for any increases in revenue due to recreational marijuana sales, which were recently legalized in Arizona, and does not include the \$416 million in ARPA funds; therefore, AFSCME believes there should be more money available for economic enhancements, especially in the second year of the MOU.

#### **Recommendation on Economics**

One can certainly understand each side's position. The Union believes it has sacrificed a great deal to help the City during hard times, and that it is not the source of the City's long-term pension problems, having agreed to pension reform initiatives. The City wants to treat all of its bargaining units equitably when it comes to across-the-board total compensation increases, and will not agree to provide higher total compensation increases to civilian employees even if those increases have a less dramatic impact on its long-term projections than increases to sworn employees. The Union wants on-going increases that, at a minimum, keep up with inflation. The City wants to maintain as much long-term flexibility as possible, and is therefore offering large one-time sums, which do not have a compounding impact on its future budgets and are not pensionable.

Further, the City does not want to give economic enhancements beyond what it has agreed to with other units given that those other units have "Most Favored Nations" language; however, Unit 2 believes it is not similarly situated to those other units given many of its unit members are not paid through the general fund. The City is following what it believes is budgeting best practice by not including the unrealized ARPA and recreational marijuana funds; the Union responds that there is certainty that those funds will be realized during the life of this FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 6

5

10

12

11

14

13

15 16

17

18

19

20 21

22 23

24

26

25

27

28

MOU. The City argues that nothing precludes the Council from dedicating some ARPA money to economic enhancements, but the Union counters that it wants an opportunity to meet about any such enhancements.

Given the uncertainty of the times we are in (with the pace of re-openings and increased economic activity not being certain), I recommend that the parties take a cautious approach but allow for the opportunity for further economic enhancements during the life of the MOU. It is also not lost on me that other units have already settled for what the City is offering the Union, and that it is difficult for the City to offer more to one unit than what other units have agreed upon. Therefore, I will recommend that the parties settle on a 2% ongoing wage increase and a 3% one-time monetary enhancement for 2021-2022, and a 1.5% ongoing wage increase and a 2.5% one-time monetary enhancement for 2022-2023 with reopener language to allow for discussion of further enhancements.

This recommendation, however, is not contingent on the Union accepting the City's "transparency package." This is because I will not be recommending those proposals as drafted. Further, I do not believe any party calculated a precise monetary value for the "transparency package," but were simply using the monetary number as an incentive. Therefore, I will be making my recommendations on those proposals as stand-alone recommendations and based on what I believe makes sense for each proposal.

The facts do support a finding that with the ARPA money and, to a lesser extent, the recreational marijuana revenue, there will be additional revenues during the MOU that can help bridge the gap between the parties' proposals, and that these additional revenues are not accounted for in the Trial Budget, meaning additional economic enhancements based on these revenues will not impact the City's other priorities outlined in the Trial Budget. I recognize that FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 7

it is hard to know the precise allowable uses for ARPA money at this point and that the amount of revenue to be generated by recreational marijuana sales is an open question. For this reason, any concrete economic enhancements tied to these new sources of revenue are premature.

I, therefore, recommend that the parties agree to an economic reopener allowing the parties to discuss further enhancements based on acceptable uses of ARPA money and any realized revenue from recreational marijuana sales. I do not recommend adopting the City's language that it will evaluate the ARPA money and unilaterally provide a non-specified percentage of premium pay. It is a fundamental right of unions to be able to meet and confer with employers over economic enhancements. Finally, I do not recommend that the parties agree to AFSCME's language that economic enhancements will automatically be tied to increased revenue. Rather, the re-opener language should be clear that the parties are required to meet over further economic enhancements based on the new revenue, but no negotiated outcome is predetermined by such language.

## **Article 2: Section 2-1(C): (Grievance Committee)**

This is part of the City's transparency package. The City proposes altering the Grievance Committee language so that the President of AFSCME Local 2384 or his/her designee does not sit on the committee that reviews Unit 2 grievances. Under the MOU, AFSCME may select to have a grievance heard by an arbitrator or through the Grievance Committee. The Grievance Committee is currently made up of an appointee of the City Manager, a City department director and the president of the local or the president's designee. The committee submits findings and advisory recommendations to the City Manager, who makes the final determination on the grievance.

The City worries that the optics of the AFSCME Local 2384 president hearing Unit 2 grievances is troublesome; therefore, the City proposes having the president of a different union sit on the committee to hear AFSCME Local 2384 grievances. The Union provided some counter language but is essentially advocating no change to the language.

I recommend no change to the language. The City offered no evidence that there has been a problem in the current set-up other than potential optics. If a member of the public were to complain about the setup, it would provide an opportunity to educate that interested member of the public and explain why the setup serves the interest of the City. Notably, an election by the Union to use the Grievance Committee process saves the City and the Union the expense of going to arbitration, and the Union is more likely to select the Grievance Committee route if it has representation on the committee. Moreover, any concern that the Union is deciding its own disputes is offset by the fact that management has two representatives on the committee and that the committee ultimately just makes recommendations to the City Manager.

Additionally, the City's proposal of having a different union president sit on the committee is highly unorthodox. The MOU is a contract between AFSCME Local 2384 and the City. It is unclear why the president of a local that has no interest in the contract between the parties (and who is not a professional neutral trained in deciding contractual disputes) should have a role in the dispute resolution process. Certainly, in my experience, I have never seen such a setup before.

#### **Article 1: Section 1-4(E): (Purging Evaluations--10 years)**

The City proposes eliminating language that says: "Upon request, performance evaluations over 10 years old will be purged from a unit member's personnel file after 10 (ten) years as an active employee." In its proposal, the City states the reason for the proposal is "to FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 9

mirror the current practice of maintaining performance evaluations electronically." The Union counters that the language should say that a unit member could still ask that "all performance evaluations 10 years old be placed into an inactive file, prohibiting them from being utilized for any performance evaluations or promotional opportunities."

I recommend adopting the Union's language. Placing old performance evaluations in inactive status eliminates any concern that physical documents are required to be produced and then destroyed. There is no reason why electronic documents cannot be marked inactive. Further, there is no reason why 10-year-old performance evaluations (as opposed to serious discipline) should be used for any purpose.

## **Article 1: Section 1-4(E): (Purging Discipline--5 years)**

The MOU currently precludes the City from considering discipline that is over five years old in any process, i.e., discipline that is over five years old cannot be considered in making progressive discipline or promotional determinations. The City argues that this has created problems both with the public wanting accountability and with other employees who are losing out on promotional opportunities despite having clean records. Specifically, the City points to some embarrassing or egregious acts of misconduct that have occurred that the City believes should not be disregarded after five years. The City emphasizes that its proposal would just give it the discretion to review old discipline.

The Union responds that the City has the authority to bypass progressive discipline for serious misconduct and that if the City chooses to give an employee a second chance, the employee should have a chance at a clean slate. The Union also argues that the push for transparency is due to cases involving police officers, and there have not been serious problems with Unit 2 members and old discipline. Moreover, the Union notes that unit members have FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 10

relied on this MOU language in either settling or choosing not to challenge discipline in the past, knowing that the discipline had a shelf life.

The parties did make steps toward each other on this proposal. The City agreed that only suspensions over five years (and not any type of discipline) should be used. The City also stated it would respect settlement agreements containing the five-year limitation language, it would exclude discipline that is defined as moral turpitude, it would consider the frequency and severity of misconduct, and it would notify an employee if the old discipline was a factor in non-selection for a promotional opportunity.

The parties were still in disagreement over whether certain types of suspensions should fall under the five-year language. Namely, the parties were in disagreement over whether discipline should last past five years if it is based on abusive or threatening behavior, on intentionally falsifying records, or on actions that bring discredit or embarrassment to the City.

The Union made clear that its movement was tied to certain economic enhancements that the City did not make.

Given the increased public focus on police misconduct, "me-too" issues, and other changing workplace expectations, it makes sense to change the *status quo* and allow the City to be able to consider serious misconduct despite its age. However, it also makes sense that not every type of discipline should be "evergreen." Moreover, employees who are bypassed for promotions based on discipline that is over five years old should have an avenue to contest the issue.

Of the types of suspensions that the parties had not come to a conditional agreement on, I believe that falsifying records is the type of misconduct that should not have a sunset date on it.

I have some concern regarding the language involving abusive or threatening behavior,

FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 11

2122

23

24

25

26

2728

specifically as it applies to stewards engaged in union activities. It is well-established that stewards have wide latitude when representing union members: "Many disciplinary actions are set aside or reduced because the cause for the discipline (often abusive language in heated exchanges with supervisors) emerged from, or was related to, union steward duties." Of course, this does not mean than anything goes and "while a steward's conduct in the course of union business is protected, the immunity is not absolute, and discipline of stewards in extreme situations has been upheld even though the basis for the discipline was related to the employee's conduct as a steward." See Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 5-74 to 5-75 (Kenneth Mays, ed., BNA Books 8th Ed. 2016). The City's response to this concern undoubtedly is that only discipline that is upheld can be used five years down the line; however, the Union's response is that this language might chill the steward's activity. I think a compromise is to include this language (as discouraging abusive behavior in the workplace is extremely important) but have some clarifying language about protected union activity. I, however, do not recommend the inclusion of discipline based on actions that bring "discredit or embarrassment to the City." This is new language from the Personnel Rules, and there are no cases yet that explain what type of conduct falls under this language. One can easily argue that any misconduct brings embarrassment to the City, and including this language might then mean all suspensions that are over five years can be used.

Moreover, if an employee is notified that old discipline was a factor in non-selection for a promotional opportunity, the employee should have the right to question whether the decision makes sense so that the employee is not forever precluded for future promotions without an ability to raise a defense.

Finally, I find the argument that employees relied on the current MOU language in making decisions regarding entering settlements or contesting discipline to be persuasive. While the employer is not proposing a retroactive imposition of discipline, the employees did rely on the rules as they were at the time, and it would be unfair to change the rules retroactively.

For these reasons, I recommend that the parties adopt language allowing the City on a moving forward basis to use suspensions that are over five years and are based on Personnel Rules 21b2 (with some mention of union steward rights), 21b4, 21b5, 21b13, 21b14, 21b15, 21b18, and 21b20; that any settlement agreement which mentions the five-year limitation be respected; and that any employee who is notified that discipline over five years old is a factor in a denied promotion be able to submit a non-binding appeal on the matter.

## **Article 1: Sections 1-4(A) and (B): (Investigations and Discipline)**

The City proposes replacing the entire sections dealing with investigations and discipline. It claims that this is cleanup language and meant to create consistency with the process that occurs with other civilian units. The City argues that no rights are being lost or protections curtailed by the new language. The Union counter proposed with language that would require the City to provide a unit member with all materials in the City's possession before conducting an investigatory interview. The Union basically is asking that civilians receive the protections afforded in the Police Officer Bill of Rights.

I do not recommend that civilians be given the same rights as the Police Officer Bill of Rights. There are many variables in an investigation and there may be legitimate reasons why management does not want to share all documents during the investigation stage. In terms of adopting the City's proposed changed language, it is unclear to me whether the Union had any objections to the proposal or if the parties simply needed more time to iron out acceptable FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 13

language. Therefore, I recommend that the parties work together to agree upon language that reflects the current practice of investigations, with the understanding that any newly agreed upon language should clarify current rights and should not curtail any existing rights.

### **Article 1: Sections 1-4(E) and (G): (Purging/Inactive Reference)**

As I understand the proposal, the City wants to replace text with a graph that shows when various documents can be removed from certain files and made inactive from other files. Xavier Frost, Deputy Human Resources Director—Labor Relations, testified that the City is simply trying to have whatever process is agreed upon be reflected in the chart. I am sure that the point of confusion for the Union is that the proposed chart incorporates the proposed changes to the five-year old discipline discussed above. My recommendation is that the parties adopt a chart that reflects whatever the parties ultimately agree upon in the other sections of the MOU. However and to be clear, the move from text to a chart by itself is not meant to change anything substantively.

#### **Article 6: Section 6-7(F) (Four Corners)**

The City is proposing language that would eliminate any past written or verbal agreement. Janice Pitts, Deputy Human Resources Director—Employee Relations, testified that there have been occasions when unions have called upon old agreements. Yet, no specific examples were given. Further, the City did not provide a list of agreements it was asking the Union to forego. My recommendation is for the City to identify any old agreements it has with the Union and discuss them on a case-by-case basis rather than asking the Union to waive unidentified rights. Therefore, I am recommending the *status quo* language.

### Article 5: Section 5-9B: (Benefits)

The City proposes eliminating language for use of sick leave in certain situations. The City stated in its proposal that it wanted to eliminate the language because it was "no longer applicable with Earned Paid Sick Time State Law." However, it became clear from the testimony of Mario Ayala, President of AFSCME Local 2384, that the current language covers situations not covered by the new state law and that the contractual language provides other additional rights. Xavier Frost testified that the different types of sick leave usages could lead to confusion and abuse; however, there were no concrete examples presented of abuse. I, therefore, recommend maintaining the *status quo* language.

#### **Article 1: Section 1-6: (New Positions/Classifications)**

The City's proposal struck out the entirety of the existing language and proposed new language. However, it is not clear why it did this. The City did include new language stating it would give written notice to the Union thirty days in advance of a position being reallocated or reclassified out of the unit. It appears from the testimony of Ayala that the Union, in addition to notice, wants an opportunity to discuss the reallocation or reclassification of such positions. The Union is not asking for a meet and confer or any veto power.

The Union proposed that it be allowed eight classification studies per year for the unit rather than the one study provided for in the current language. Janice Pitts testified that the City does not have the resources to conduct that many studies, and that the City is in the process of doing a high-level classification study of all its positions. The Union responds that such a citywide study will take a long time to complete and many of its positions are paid below market rates.

I recommend that the parties work together on cleanup language. I also recommend that the City give 30 days' notice of reallocations or reclassifications which will take positions out of the unit and meet with the Union within that 30-day time period to discuss the reallocations or reclassifications. Any such meeting shall not prevent the reallocation or reclassification.

Moreover, as a compromise, I recommend that the parties agree to two classification studies per year. This should not overwhelm the City and acknowledges the importance of classification studies.

### **Article 1: Section 1.3 J (Janus Related Litigation)**

The parties are discussing the inclusion of new language to account for a possible court order related to litigation involving release time. From the presentations at the hearing, the outstanding issue seems to be whether the Union will have a chance to meet with the City to discuss implementing any court order that might require a change in how release time is given. The Union acknowledges that any process for giving input would have to be expedited given the need to be in compliance with an enforceable court order, if one exists. My recommendation is that the parties agree to meet and discuss ways of implementing an enforceable court order if one is issued. While the Union's written proposal called for any dispute going to arbitration, it is unclear that the arbitration process could move fast enough to ensure the parties are in compliance with a court order in a timely manner. The parties should discuss alternative methods by which they might meet and come to a speedy resolution. This might include agreeing to factfinding.

#### **Union Proposal #27: Fairness Agreement**

AFSCME Local 2384 is asking for a "Most Favored Nations" clause that will ensure it is treated equitably to other units. The written proposal indicates the "Most Favored Nations" FACTFINDING REPORT AND ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS - 16

proposal was contingent on the parties not going to factfinding; however, at the hearing, the Union made clear the proposal is still on the table. I see no reason why AFSCME Local 2384 should not receive the same protection that other units received. I certainly see no reason why such a clause should be conditioned on a unit not exercising its right to go to factfinding. For this reason, I recommend inclusion of a "Most Favored Nations" clause.

## **Article 1, Section 1-3(I): (Fair and Impartial Grievance Language)**

The Union proposes allowing all unit members to grieve any treatment that is not fair and impartial. The City acknowledged at the factfinding that it highly values a respectful workplace and has methods for addressing allegations of unfair treatment. However, the City's position, which is not an uncommon one, is that the grievance process should be limited to contractual violations. My recommendation is that the parties discuss a way outside the grievance process that the Union can bring forth and track concerns regarding unfair treatment.

## **Article 2, Section 2-1(B): Grievance Language**

The Union seeks to expand the definition of a grievance to include unacceptable workplace conduct and abuse of title or authority. The City stated that it does not tolerate such behavior but that addressing these issues through the grievance process is not the proper forum. Again, my recommendation is that the parties discuss a way outside the grievance process that the Union can bring forth and track concerns regarding abusive supervisors or managers.

The Union also seeks language that the City be required to give an explanation should it dismiss a grievance on procedural grounds. Xavier Frost testified that this should be occurring. I recommend adopting this part of the Union's proposal so that reasons are consistently given for denials of grievances.

1

2

6 7

5

9

10

8

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

24 25

26 27

28

Article 1, Section 1-3: (Union Rights)

The Union seeks language making Union release time count as time worked in the unit member's job classification. The Union stated that it has concerns that a steward who goes on release time during a probationary period after a promotion and is on release time for a lengthy period of time risks not passing probation upon return from release time due to someone not approving of his/her union activity. The City responds that if there is evidence of such a thing occurring, the Union steward could file a charge with PERB. The Union responds that proving someone did not pass probation due to union animus is a difficult proposition.

The Union poses a hypothetical but there is no evidence of a steward returning from release time and then failing probation. For this reason, I recommend the status quo language. I also make this recommendation because I am hesitant to recommend language that might impinge on the Civil Service Board's jurisdiction and because a union steward would be able to file a charge with PERB if there is evidence of union animus.

#### **CONCLUSION**

I discussed the issues that the parties focused on at the hearing. I recommend that the status quo remain if there any issues on which the parties did not orally present and on which I did not comment. I sincerely hope that these recommendations assist the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement.

Date: April 7, 2021